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NOTES AND COMMENT
Washington therefore adopts what seems to be a middle ground
and will permit such a sale to be good against creditors sa far as
the proceeds are applied to reduce the lien.
Pnmmsrs CAVEDER.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SEARCH AND SEIZURE, WITHOUT WAR-
RANT, OF AN AUTOMOIBLE--REASONAB:LE CAUSE-ANoNYMOUS TIPS.
Since the case of Carroll v. United States,' it has become a generally
recognized principle of law that an officer may make a search and
seizure of an automobile without a warrant, provided that the
officer has probable cause to make the search. The Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States specifically is aimed
to protect the people against "unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures."' The Carroll case is based on the theory that if the other
has probable cause the search of an automobile is not an unrea-
sonable search." The distinction drawn is that while the warrant
can easily be issued to search a dwelling house,3 yet because of the
necessity of the situation when an officer has probable cause to
believe that a moving object such as an automobile or motor boat
contains contraband, it would be actually unreasonable to expect
the officer to then get a search warrant, because in the meantime
the moving object would likely be far beyond the reach of the
officer. The Carroll case, supra, which was decided in 1925, has
settled the law as far as the United States Supreme Court is con-
cerned, and the principle has since been applied several times in
other Federal cases.4
The constitutionality of a search and seizure of an automobile
without a warrant has been upheld recently in the State of Wash-
mgton in the case of State v. Knudsen.5 In this case a Federal
prohibition officer received a tip from an unknown person that the
defendant was supplying intoxicating liquors in a certain locality
The officer knew that the defendant had been previously convicted
of the crime of possession, and acting upon the tip he had re-
ceived, he and some other officers located the defendant's truck,
followed it, noticed that it was loaded heavily, and saw it turn into
'267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. CtL Rep 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1924).
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Sutherland dissenting.
2Article IV of the Amendments to the United States Constitution.
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524
(1886) Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B
834, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, Ann. Cas. 1915C. 1177 (1914) Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4, 51 A. L. R. 409 (1925).
'United States v. One Reo Truck, 6 Fed. (2d) 412 (1925) Latle v.
United States, 5 Fed. (2d) 622 (1925), holding a search and seizure valid
as long as the officers had probable cause; Pinder v. United States, 4 Fed.
(2d) 390 (1925), where an inspector seized liquor in a parker car- Lafazza
v. United States, 4 Fed. (2d) 817 (1925), where the officers in following
a truck saw through its lattice sides that it contained cases of liquor.
r 54 Wash. Dec. 39, 280 Pac. 922 (1929).
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a private garage mentioned in the tip. One of the officers ran into
the garage, saw several kegs of liquor in the truck, and then called
the other officers who made the seizure and arrest. The Court held
that a mere tip from an unknown person that one is bootlegging
is not sufficient probable cause to make a lawful search, but knowl-
edge that the defendant had been guilty of possession, together
with the fact that one of the officers saw several kegs in the back
of the defendant's truck, is sufficient probable cause to justify a
search and seizure without a search warrant.
The search and seizure involved in the Knudsen case, supra, was
attacked upon the ground that the search and seizure without a war-
rant was invalid in view of the Fourth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, inasmuch as the search was made by
Federal officers.6 As stated before, that an automobile may be
lawfully searched and its contraband seized without a warrant is
clearly laid down in Carroll v. United States, supra provided
there is reasonable cause to believe that the contents of the automo-
bile offend against the law. State v. Secrest,8 a Washington case,
recognizes the rule that no search warrant is necessary to seize
liquor in an automobile where the car was wrecked and the liquor
scattered around the car. The rule that no search warrant is nec-
essary when the liquor was in plain view in the defendant's automo-
bile, is also laid down in State v. Nilnch.9 The Carroll case further
says that "the right to search and the validity of the seizure are not
dependent upon the right to arrest." In this view the Washington
case of State v. Gibbons,10 where the arrest of the defendant and
search of his automobile without a warrant of arrest or a search
wararnt was held without authority of law, might possibly be
reconciled, because in the Gibbons case the charge of possession
being only a misdemeanor there could have been no lawful arrest
without a warrant unless the crime was actually committed within
the presence of the officers, while in both the Carroll and the Knud-
sen cases the Courts proceed on the theory that the seizures came
before the arrest, and as long as they were reasonable and the offi-
cers had probable cause they would not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. The Knudsen case
As the search and seizure was made by Federal officers, the claim for
protection under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States was properly invoked. Weeks v. United States, see Note 3, supra.
While the Supreme Court of Washington has stated in State v. Gibbons,
see Note 10, supra, that Sec. 7 Art. I of the state constitution that "No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law," must be interpreted to uphold substantially
the same rights as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consi-
tution, yet the Federal Constitution would have no application to a search
and seizure made solely by State officers. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S.
465, 41 Supr. Ct. 475, 65 L. ed. 1048, 13 A. L. R. 1159 (1921), Mr. Just-ice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting.
ISee Note 1, supra.
'131Wash. 344, 230 Pac. 129 (1924.)
1131 Wash. 344, 230 Pac. 129 (1924).
"0118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1924).
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acknowledges that the rule laid down in State v. Gibbons, supra, is
still good law, notwithstanding, the two cases are hard to reconcile
unless on the slight distinction already mentioned. Both the
Knudsen case and the Carroll case appear to be inconsistent with
State v. Gibbons in so far as the latter says, in dictum, that a per-
son in his automobile on a public street has as much right to be
protected "against arrest and search without authority of a war-
rant of arrest, or a search warrant, as fully as he would have been
protected had he and his possession been actually inside his own
dwelling. ' "
All courts agree that mere suspicion is not sufficient ground to
constitute probable cause to make a search and seizure. The diffi-
culty, however, arises in drawing a line between mere suspicion
and reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being committed.
What is probable cause is defined in Stacey v. Emory" as follows.
"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to
warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that an of-
fense has been committed, it is sufficient." That merely receiving
a tip from an unknown person is not sufficient probable cause for
a search and seizure of an automobile is well brought out in United
States v. Allen."2 That this is correct is recogized by the Wash-
ington Court in the Knudsen case, supra,2" though the Court con-
cluded that what the officer saw when he entered into the garage
and noticed the kegs in the back of the truck, could support a rea-
sonable belief that the defendant was violating the law, and would
thus constitute probable cause for the subsequent search and seiz-
ure. It would seem to follow, however, that a mere tip would not
warrant search of an automobile where the machine to all outward
appearances is innocent and does not itself, or by the conduct of
its occupants, create reasonable grounds to believe that it is being
used in violation of law.
In conclusion, as far as the Federal courts are concerned, it is
settled that an officer may make a search and seizure of an automo-
bile without a warrant provided he has probable cause to believe that
it contains contraband liquor. As far as the Supreme Court of
Washington is concerned, it without doubt recognizes the general
principle as already laid down. The question in all cases will be
whether the officer in making the search and seizure has probable
cause, and this question is one of fact according to the circum-
stances of each particular case. SHEm" R. HuiyurN.
97 U. S. 642, 24 L. ed. 1035 (1878).
-16 Fed. (2d) 320 (1926).
" See Note 5, supra.
